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H
ow is it that Moneyball (Lewis,
2003), a book seemingly about
baseball, was among the Economist’s
Books of 2003 in the Economics &
Business category, was a New York
Times bestseller, is referenced in Larry
Bossidy’s most recent book (Bossidy & Cha-
ran, 2004), and motivated an argument in
the National Review that American educa-
tion would do well to adopt the rigorous
analysis employed by Billy Beane, the gen-
eral manager of the Oakland Athletics
(Lips, 2004)?
Moneyball is a book about baseball. When
read through the lens of a management re-
searcher, however, it is also a book about
human resource management, innovation,
resistance to change, competitive advantage,
and achieving excellence. The focus of this
article, therefore, will be on what HR execu-
tives and scholars can learn from the Money-
ball phenomenon. While many would agree
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that the radical innovation (sabermetrics) de-
scribed in Moneyball represents a “new vision
of management” in baseball, this article de-
scribes how adopting a broader lens might
contribute to a “new vision of HRM” in vari-
ous types of organizations.1
First, a bit about the book. Lewis’s best-
seller describes how Billy Beane revolutionized
Major League Baseball (MLB) by demonstrat-
ing how maximizing efficiency can leverage
limited resources to create a successful out-
come. Bill James, author of the comprehensive
Historical Baseball Abstract (2001), spent three
decades challenging the national pastime’s
conventional wisdom, applying rigorous sta-
tistical analysis (sabermetrics) to determine the
traits most associated with a player’s true value
to his team. James’s findings were inconsistent
with most baseball experts’ opinions, and his
research was ignored for years. 
Until, that is, Billy Beane em-
braced sabermetrics and put it into
practice. Beane maximized his
team’s efficiency, focusing on play-
ers with the traits most important
for winning ballgames, rather than
those with impressive traditional
statistics. The strategy worked: over
the past five years, Beane’s Athlet-
ics have been near the top of the
league’s standings despite being
outspent by nearly all their com-
petitors (Lips, 2004).
Outside the “Club” of base-
ball’s establishment, the level of in-
terest in the ideas presented in the
book has been considerable. The
Oakland Athletics’ front office has
had calls from a cross-section of U.S. business
and sports entities: teams from the NFL, NBA
and NHL; Wall Street firms, Fortune 500 com-
panies, and Hollywood studios. The people
most certain they had nothing to learn from
the book, however, were in the front offices of
other major league teams (Lewis 2004). Lewis
argues that “they were ‘a Club.’ In business if
someone exposes the trade secrets of your
most efficient competitor, you’re elated. Even
if you have your doubts, you grab the book,
peek inside, check it out. Not in baseball. In
baseball many of Beane’s competitors were fu-
rious. In the Club there was no need to read
the book, and, with the exception of several
owners who took an interest, baseball execu-
tives bragged that they hadn’t read the book
because, well, it was offensive” (Lewis, 2004).
Moneyball thus describes how Billy Beane
revolutionized Major League Baseball by ex-
ploiting an inefficiency in the baseball labor
market (i.e., the ability to get on base had
been seriously undervalued). Beane exploited
the inefficiency by implementing a radical
human resource management innovation—
an employee (player) performance measure-
ment and feedback system that allowed him
to field a highly competitive team while hav-
ing one of the lowest payrolls in Major League
Baseball. The purpose of this article is to in-
vestigate the Moneyball story to glean what
lessons are contained therein for HR execu-
tives and scholars concerning innovation, re-
sistance to change, and competitive advan-
tage all within the context of human resource
management. We address four questions re-
lated to the Moneyball story that have rele-
vance to successfully implementing human
resource management innovations: (1) why
did it take so long for the sabermetrics inno-
vation to be adopted? (2) how is it that Beane
was successful in having sabermetrics imple-
mented by the A’s? (3) does sabermetrics pro-
vide a competitive advantage, and if so, how?
and (4) is the competitive advantage provided
by sabermetrics sustainable? 
In investigating each of the above ques-
tions, we discuss (a) current management lit-
erature related to the question; (b) how that
literature plays out in the Moneyball story;
and (c) implications for the HR executive.
The article concludes with a general discus-
sion of the relevance of the Moneyball story
to HR executives. Prior to addressing these
questions, we briefly describe the relevance
of the Moneyball story in today’s HR context
and the radical innovation at the center of
Moneyball—sabermetrics.
Moneyball and the Current HR
Context
As firms face increasing global competition,
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trend toward commoditization of product
markets, they must find ways to better lever-
age their human capital (Wright & Snell,
2005). This requires a massive rethinking of
the role of HR and a revolutionary approach
to managing people in organizations. Unfor-
tunately, a number of writers have found
that HR functions serve as bureaucratic ob-
stacles, rather than drivers of positive change
in organizations (Hammonds, 2005; Losey,
Meisinger, & Ulrich, 2005; Stewart, 1996). 
While many authors bemoan the current
state of HR, few present a coherent plan or
vision for how to dramatically change the
function. Such change requires radical inno-
vations in how HR professionals design and
implement processes aimed at building com-
petitive advantage through people. These are
changes that do not generally characterize
HR functions. While one might look to com-
pany stories such as Continental Airlines
(Carrig, 1997), or IBM (Gerstner, 2002) for
ideas concerning how to drive organiza-
tional change, perhaps the story presented in




Sabermetrics refers to a statistically based ap-
proach for developing and applying objective
knowledge to baseball. This statistical ap-
proach is an important determinant of player
evaluation and of “in-game” tactics (e.g.,
bunting, stealing). The term derives from
SABR, the acronym for the Society for Ameri-
can Baseball Research. Historically, assessing
player talent favored future potential over
past performance; sabermetrics, on the other
hand, focuses on past performance as a pre-
dictor of future performance. While statistics
(e.g., batting average [BA] and earned run av-
erage [ERA]) were used previous to its advent,
sabermetrics has contributed different statis-
tics, which it is argued, are better predictors
of player contribution to team performance
(e.g., on-base percentage plus slugging per-
centage [OPS]). In addition to player assess-
ment and selection becoming oriented more
toward performance, as opposed to potential,
and there being more of a focus on (new) sta-
tistics, certain in-game decisions (e.g., sacri-
fice bunts, stolen bases) are discouraged
within a sabermetric approach. Although, in
the traditional baseball view, these tactics are
often associated with a team’s ability to
“manufacture” runs by advancing a base run-
ner, the sabermetric approach eschews game
tactics that accept a very likely out to ad-
vance a runner without significantly increas-
ing the probability of scoring runs (James,
1986; Katsunori, 2001; Lewis, 2003). That is,
in-game decisions based on tradition or intu-
ition give way to decisions based
on statistical probability, which
works against bunting and steal-
ing.2
Sabermetrics and HR
In essence, the sabermetrics ap-
proach described in Moneyball is
relevant to issues corporations
and HR functions confront. First,
firms must develop a competitive
strategy. Such a strategy should be
consistent over time, providing a
way to differentiate the firm from
competitors while requiring ap-
propriate tactical decisions made
in response to industry and local
conditions. Sabermetrics has resulted in
strategic modifications in terms of human
capital strategy and in-game, tactical deci-
sions in baseball.
Second, firms must hire individuals to ex-
ecute their strategy. These hiring decisions
entail identifying relevant knowledges, skills,
and abilities (KSAs) and then developing
measures that validly assess those characteris-
tics. Sabermetrics focused baseball’s attention
on different KSAs than were previously con-
sidered relevant and then offered new ways
of assessing those characteristics. It is these
areas of overlap (i.e., modifications in human
capital strategy, in tactical decisions, in rele-
vant KSAs, and in KSA assessment) that make
Moneyball an interesting example of how
firms might exploit better information to
build human capital strategies that result in
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sons gleaned from sabermetrics (as described
in Moneyball) may provide unique insights
into how firms might achieve competitive
advantage, and it is in this context that we
examine the questions that follow. 
Why Did It Take So Long for
Sabermetrics to Be Adopted?
New statistics similar to those  used in saber-
metrics were proposed close to 50 years prior
to the Athletics’ adoption of sabermetrics in
2001. Bill James, author of the
comprehensive Historical Baseball
Abstract (James, 2001), spent
three decades challenging the na-
tional pastime’s conventional wis-
dom, applying rigorous statistical
analysis to determine the traits
most associated with a player’s
true value to his team. James’s
findings and his approach were ig-
nored for years. In 1954, long be-
fore James’s seminal work, Branch
Rickey, then-general manager of
the Pittsburgh Pirates, proposed a
new statistical approach for as-
sessing batting proficiency
(Rickey’s approach emphasized
on-base percentage, as does saber-
metrics). These early signals con-
cerning new, potentially superior approaches
for assessing player talent were ignored for
decades. How might we explain that?
The Management of Innovation
Literature
We turn to the management of innovation lit-
erature for insights concerning delays in imple-
menting novel ideas. As argued in that litera-
ture, implementing organizational innovations
is dependent upon an appreciation of the at-
tributes of a focal innovation (Damanpour,
1991; Wolfe, 1995). Attributes that are most rel-
evant to the adoption and implementation of
HRM innovations are as follows:
• Uncertainty—lack of knowledge con-
cerning the link between an innovation’s
inputs, processes, and outcomes;
• Organizational Focus—administrative
versus technical—the aspect of the or-
ganization to which the innovation is
most relevant; 
• Radicalness—the extent to which an in-
novation is novel, represents change,
and thus implies new behaviors; 
• Magnitude—the extent of change to ex-
isting structure, personnel, and financial
resources implied by an innovation; and
• Pervasiveness—the number of organiza-
tional members who are expected to
change their behaviors due to the inno-
vation (Wolfe, 1995).
While uncertainty is inherent to the im-
plementation of most innovations (Kanter,
1988; Storey, 2004; Tushman & Nelson,
1990), given that they are intangible, admin-
istrative innovations, HRM innovations tend
to be characterized by considerable uncer-
tainty. Radicalness, magnitude, and perva-
siveness can each contribute to the uncer-
tainty that surrounds the implementation of
an HRM innovation. Uncertainty, in turn,
contributes to innovation resistance, which is
often unrelated to the objective merit of an
innovation, depending rather on the struc-
tural and personal consequences it implies. 
In addition to an innovation’s attributes,
organizational context is an important deter-
minant of innovation adoption and imple-
mentation (Damanpour, 1991). In tradition-
bound organizations, strategic frames of
reference, which had provided direction,
often become blinders; established processes,
which had provided efficiencies, become
mindless routines; commitment to particular
constituencies (e.g., employees, suppliers),
which had provided resources, restricts flexi-
bility; and values, which once unified and
inspired, harden into rigid rules and regula-
tions (Sull, 1999). Tradition-bound organiza-
tions thus are not prone to change, certainly
not to radical innovation (Hamel, 1996;
Miller, 1990) as “core capabilities” become
“core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In
tradition-bound institutions such as Major
League Baseball (MLB), the frames of refer-
ence, established processes, constituency
commitments, and restrictive values de-
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scribed by Sull can interact in a manner that
reinforces the status quo. 
The Management of Innovation
Literature and the Moneyball Story
Tradition
Why would it be that MLB teams, wealthy
and otherwise, would be resistant to adopt-
ing means of assessing talent that would re-
sult in paying less for a given level of talent?
We suggest that one explanation lies in MLB
being very tradition-bound and character-
ized by deep respect for convention and
precedent. The past commissioner of MLB,
Fay Vincent, expressed this powerfully and
succinctly: “Baseball is all about memories”
(Vincent, 2005). 
MLB has a very rich history and strong
tradition. Continuity and common experi-
ence are endemic in MLB. Since 1990, ap-
proximately 85% of field managers have had
MLB playing experience. The remaining 15%
have had significant minor league manage-
rial, major league coaching, and/or front of-
fice experience (Holtz, 2005). Similarly, vir-
tually all MLB coaches have considerable
professional baseball backgrounds, and
scouts are former professional players and/or
have been trained by the MLB Scouting Bu-
reau. Until the advent of sabermetrics, this
was the case with front-office personnel (e.g.,
general managers, directors of baseball oper-
ations, scouting directors) as well.
Although certain aspects of baseball have
changed over the years (e.g., the designated
hitter rule, specifications concerning the ball,
the height of the pitcher’s mound), preferred
player characteristics have remained constant.
The desired attributes of position players
focus on the “five tools” (hitting for average,
hitting for power, fielding, foot speed, and
arm strength) while those of pitchers focus on
three factors (arm strength, number of pitches
thrown, and control). “Make-up” (i.e., charac-
ter, personality) attributes such as aggressive-
ness, instinct, dedication, and work ethic
apply to both position players and pitchers.
Until very recently, changes in the evaluation
of potential talent have been due to techno-
logical advances and related improvements in
the precision with which physical characteris-
tics (e.g., running speed, arm strength) are
measured, not in the characteris-
tics that are assessed.
Resistance
The roles of the field manager and
of the scout change dramatically
with the adoption of sabermetrics.
These changes imply serious chal-
lenges to the extant skills as well
as to the job security of individu-
als in these roles. In MLB’s con-
ventional way of doing things,
field managers have significant
control over talent selection and
over in-game tactics. This “field
manager-centric” orientation,
however, is inconsistent with full
implementation of sabermetrics
wherein the field managers have a
greatly diminished role (e.g., in
talent selection and in-game tac-
tics that are based to a consider-
ably greater extent on statistics).
As described in Moneyball, Beane
hired Art Howe as the Athletics’ manager be-
cause he believed that Howe would follow
the instructions of the front office. 
Adopting sabermetrics also results in a dra-
matically decreased emphasis on professional
discretion and an increased emphasis on sta-
tistics on the part of scouts and administrators
responsible for evaluating and selecting talent.
Moreover, these scouts and administrators are
unlikely to have considerable training in sta-
tistics. The inherent routinization of sabermet-
rics means that making and implementing de-
cisions becomes relatively simple, and the
supply of people qualified to fill related roles
becomes more abundant. Resistance to saber-
metrics thus can be understood as the natural
reaction to a radical innovation that chal-
lenges extant skills as well as job security. The
following statements are indicative of this:
A lot of what scouts feel they do is based
on gut instinct, their history of being in













Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
116 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Spring 2006
have a hard time quantifying it. . . .
they see all these . . . charts and graphs
. . . and maybe when you don’t under-
stand something, you feel a little chal-
lenged by it. (Gary Hughes, Chicago
Cubs’ assistant GM and MLB scout for
30 years, in Schwarz, 2005)
. . . the main adversarial thing is that
some of our old-time guys are losing
jobs that we didn’t feel they should be
losing. . . . we correlate it to the fact that
some of the computer stuff is causing
that, and we resent it. (Eddie Bane, the
California Angels’ scouting di-
rector, in Schwarz, 2005)
We see then that due to its
tradition-bound nature, MLB has
not been prone to change, cer-
tainly not to radical innovation. As
argued above, in tradition-bound
institutions such as MLB, frames of
reference, established processes,
constituency commitments, and
values interact in a manner that re-
inforces the status quo. Moreover,
the attributes of sabermetrics (i.e.,
it is a radical, administrative, per-
vasive innovation with considerable magni-
tude) create considerable uncertainty and
resistance to its implementation. This uncer-
tainty and resistance are exacerbated by the
perceived threat of sabermetrics to extant job
skill sets and to job security.
Implications of the Moneyball Story
for the HR Executive: Relating the HR
Context to MLB
While the context of HR varies considerably
at the level of the organization (e.g., public
vs. private, large vs. small, technology vs.
manufacturing vs. service, etc.), the profes-
sion of HR in many ways resembles the tra-
dition-bound nature of MLB. HR has been
criticized for its administrative bureaucracy,
unwillingness to change, and inability to
add value from Drucker (1954) to Stewart
(1996) to Hammonds (2005). While willing
to occasionally chase after certain fads such
as T-groups or handwriting analysis, most HR
professionals can be characterized as risk-
and change-averse.
However, HR professionals are not alone
in resisting to change to HR practices. Snell
and Dean (1994) have noted that HR systems
are notoriously intractable. Wright and Snell
(1998) suggested that this stems in part from
individual users’ (e.g., HR’s managerial clients)
discomfort with changing their normal rou-
tines. For instance, despite significant research
support for the superior validity of structured
behavioral interviews over traditional unstruc-
tured interviews, many companies and inter-
viewers continue to use the latter. In many
cases, interviewers are unwilling to cede deci-
sion-making control to a formulaic score, pre-
ferring to use their intuition built up over
years of experience. 
While all firms seek to leverage their
human capital as a competitive weapon, few
seem to have done so successfully. The past
few years have increasingly focused HR prac-
titioners’ attention on HR metrics (Becker,
Huselid, & Ulrich, 2001; Fitz-Enz & Davison,
2001), but in large part these efforts have not
led to developing better measures to assess
previously identified phenomena or to mak-
ing better use of existing measures. With the
notable exception of the Sears story (Rucci,
Kirn, & Quinn, 1998), efforts to develop HR
metrics have seldom led to comprehensive
questioning of either business tactics or
human capital strategy. This omission stems
from HR professionals tending to be tradi-
tion-bound and risk-averse (Hammonds,
2005) and from the fact that such a compre-
hensive, sabermetrics-type approach would
be radical, of significant magnitude, quite
pervasive, and, therefore, characterized by
considerable uncertainty. We now return to
the Moneyball story to see how sabermetrics
was successfully implemented in spite of a
similarly unfavorable context.
How Did Beane Successfully
Implement Sabermetrics in the
Oakland Athletics?
As described earlier, MLB is a tradition-
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limiting frames of reference, processes, and
constituency commitments that interact in a
manner that reinforces the status quo. Con-
siderable force or energy would be necessary
to counter these inertial forces. What was the
force, or energy, that resulted in sabermetrics
being adopted by the Oakland A’s?
The Management of Innovation
Literature: Overcoming Resistance
Given the uncertainty surrounding most
HRM innovations (HRMIs) and due to po-
tential resistance, HRMI implementation is
determined by a combination of the power
of an innovation champion and by organi-
zational context. The presence of an inno-
vation champion—the individual who pro-
vides energy and momentum to the
implementation process by advocating and
promoting an innovation—is an important
determinant of successful innovation imple-
mentation (Howell & Higgins, 1990). A
champion’s efforts are necessary to counter
inherent organizational resistance to
change; a new idea either finds a champion
or dies (Schon, 1963, 1976). Predicting
HRMI consequences is inherently uncertain,
and the innovation’s very existence can be
threatening to vested interests, so such in-
novations tend to stimulate political activity
(Johns, 1993). The relative power of organi-
zational actors resolves such activity. While
a champion is necessary to personify and
make an administrative innovation tangi-
ble, his/her power is also necessary to
counter threatened groups with necessary
power and authority (Galbraith, 1982). A
critical component of successful implemen-
tation of HRMIs, therefore, is the existence
and power of an innovation champion
(Wolfe, 1995).
In addition to the power of the innova-
tion champion, organizational context is an
important determinant of HRMI implemen-
tation. These two innovation determi-
nants—champion power and organiza-
tional context—interact in HRMI
implementation such that one can compen-
sate for the other (Wolfe, 1995). The more
congruent an innovation is with an organi-
zation’s context, the less “pushing” of the
innovation and trying to enlist increasing
levels of organizational support is necessary
on the part of the champion. 
As argued earlier, MLB had become an
unwitting prisoner of industry convention.
Hamel and Getz (2004) argue that to
counter such convention and resulting iner-
tia with radical innovation, an understand-
ing must emerge that standard industry
practices have become “dogma” justified
solely by precedent. An innova-
tion champion, therefore, is nec-
essary to challenge deeply held
convention. In addition, a semi-
nal element of organizational
context, discontinuities in tech-
nology, is often an important de-
terminant of radical innovation
(Hamel & Getz, 2004). 
The Moneyball Story and
Overcoming Resistance
As discussed earlier, the context
surrounding the Oakland A’s was
inhospitable to sabermetrics. The
very strong influence of tradition
and history (i.e., “Baseball is all about mem-
ories” [Vincent, 2005]) worked against inno-
vation. The threat of sabermetrics to extant
skills and to livelihoods resulted in consider-
able resistance to the innovation. As sug-
gested in the innovation literature, in such
situations, innovation implementation is de-
pendent upon the innovation champion
having considerable organizational power. 
As described by Lewis, Beane was the pro-
totypical innovation champion. He had the
necessary energy, commitment, and organi-
zational power to propel the adoption and
implementation of sabermetrics. Lewis de-
scribes Beane as a man of boundless energy:
“It was hard to know which of Billy’s quali-
ties was most important to his team’s suc-
cess: his energy, his resourcefulness, his in-
telligence, or his ability to scare the living s---
out of even very large professional baseball
players” (2003, p. 153). In addition, Beane
was committed to sabermetrics; it was






change; a new idea
either finds a
champion or dies.
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one-half of the scouts that were with the A’s
for the 2002 draft described in Moneyball re-
main with the team. In addition, Beane was
(almost) all-powerful, reporting only to team
ownership. 
A second important determinant of the
implementation of sabermetrics were ad-
vances in computing technology, mainly
powerful PCs, that provided the fast, pow-
erful computational capabilities necessary
for implementing the innovation. We see
then that both a powerful innovation
champion and discontinuities in technol-
ogy were in place for the adop-
tion and implementation of
sabermetrics by the Oakland A’s.
Implications of the




HR professionals are not generally
known for their organizational
power or their ability to effectively
champion change within their or-
ganizations. Authors who advo-
cate implementing HRM innova-
tions inevitably cite the need for “support
from top management” as a prerequisite to ef-
fective implementation. This is not surprising
given the history of HR and its place as a staff
function. Consequently, adopting a sabermet-
rics-type approach to HR requires an energetic
and charismatic champion.
Depending upon the nature of the inno-
vation, two types of champions might emerge.
For internal HR innovations a visionary and
intelligent senior vice president of human re-
sources (SVPHR) might effectively champion
the program. For instance, Randy McDonald,
as SVPHR at Verizon, pushed through the de-
velopment of an HR scorecard (Walker & Mac-
Donald, 2001), one of the first of its kind.
Since becoming the SVPHR at IBM, he has im-
plemented a similar, yet more extensive HR
scorecard. Because the scorecard largely im-
pacts only the HR organization, he was able to
effect the innovation without a significant
champion external to the HR function.
However, when an HR innovation im-
pacts those outside HR, in particular the line
organization (i.e., it has significant magni-
tude and pervasiveness), an external cham-
pion will likely be required. For instance,
Dave Pace, SVPHR at Starbucks, describes the
fact that after reading Moneyball, the chair-
man and CEO, Howard Schultz, tasked HR
with the challenge of identifying Starbucks’s
equivalent of OBP. Such a champion, exter-
nal to HR, bodes well for Starbucks’s ability
to push this innovation through to success-
ful implementation.
The implementation of global HR infor-
mation systems (HRISs) has become almost
ubiquitous within large multinational corpo-
rations. These systems compile and store a
vast amount of data on all employees, across
all jobs, worldwide. These data provide the
foundation for building a sabermetrics-type
approach to HRM. The effective use of HRIS
in this manner, however, as in the case of
sabermetrics, necessitates effective champi-
oning as well as significant technological
knowledge and support. 
Does Sabermetrics Provide a




In an effort to assess how sabermetrics
might provide a competitive advantage, we
employ the resource-based view (RBV) of
the firm, a perspective that has emerged as
a major strategic paradigm (Berman, Down,
& Hill, 2002). According to Barney (1991), a
firm’s resources “include all assets, capabili-
ties, organizational processes, firm attrib-
utes, information, knowledge, etc. con-
trolled by a firm that enable the firm to
conceive of and implement strategies that
improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (p.
101).3 As argued by Barney (1991, 1995),
the RBV stipulates that firms are endowed
with heterogeneous bundles of resources
and that competitive advantage accrues if,
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(1) valuable, in the sense of enabling
an organization to conceive of and/or
implement strategies that exploit op-
portunities and/or improve its effec-
tiveness and
(2) rare, among current and potential
competitors. A resource that is pos-
sessed by a large number of organiza-
tions will not be a source of competi-
tive advantage.
The Moneyball Story and the
Strategic Management Literature
Sabermetrics works. The Athletics’ ap-
proach to identifying hitters with superior
skills at reaching base without paying a
market premium for them has resulted in
winning games at a discount relative to the
competition. Beane’s A’s have been near
the top of the league’s standings despite
being outspent by nearly all their competi-
tors (Hakes & Sauer, 2004; Lips, 2004).
Table I presents evidence of this.
Since Billy Beane took over the Athlet-
ics prior to the 1998 season, the team’s
winning percentage has increased dramati-
cally, while the team’s payroll has de-
creased just as dramatically. By identifying
players with superior skills not so identified
by competitors, sabermetrics meets the
RBV “value” criterion. When implemented
by Beane (in preparation for the 2002
draft), sabermetrics met the RBV “rare” cri-
terion as well. Based on the RBV criteria,
therefore, we see how sabermetrics can pro-
vide a competitive advantage.
Implications of the Moneyball
Story for the HR Executive:
Achieving Competitive Advantage
via HR Innovation
One can certainly see how sabermetrics en-
ables the Oakland Athletics to achieve supe-
rior performance at lower cost. The superior
use of data to exploit information asymme-
tries gives the team the ability to attract
high-quality players at a lower than market
price. Imagine how valuable it would be for
companies to have the ability to identify, at-
tract, and retain superior talent at a cost ad-
vantage relative to competitors.
Returning to the HRIS example, note
that vast reservoirs of data now exist that
have the potential to provide insight con-
cerning the characteristics of the most tal-
ented employees and their location within
the organization. While such data may be
embedded in the system, without the abil-
ity to exploit that data, an expensive HRIS
becomes virtually useless for gaining com-
petitive advantage. For example, one HR
executive in a working group on HR func-
tional excellence described his firm’s HRIS
as follows: “$200 million later, now I know
how many employees I have . . . almost.” 
On the other hand, IBM has increas-
ingly focused on how it might exploit the
information embedded in its HRIS as a way
of outperforming competitors. IBM’s HRIS
contains information on each consultant’s
skills and experience relevant to a number
of different types of consulting projects as
well as each consultant’s salary and loca-
tion. IBM’s consulting opportunities arise
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1991–1997 1998–2005 2002–2005*
Win % 47.5 56.5 58.3
Win % Rank** 18.1 8.2 8.3
Payroll Rank 12.7 24.8 22.3
Cost/Win Rank 17.6 4.4 5.8
* since the Moneyball draft.
** among 30 teams
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all around the globe for limited periods of
time; the firm needs to identify the skill
sets of consultants and how they match
various project requirements. Conse-
quently, IBM has gained a competitive ad-
vantage through leveraging the informa-
tion in its HRIS to find (a) the right
consultant (i.e., with the relevant skills and
experience), (b) the right place (i.e., at or
closest to the project geographically), and
(c) the right price (i.e., the lowest cost con-
sultant). Thus, IBM is able to exploit HRIS
information to have successful projects
that are extremely cost-effective
(Kirkpatrick, 2005). As does
sabermetrics for the Oakland A’s,
IBM’s HRIS contributes a com-
petitive advantage by providing
valuable information that is rare






We return to the RBV to address
the potential of sabermetrics providing a sus-
tained competitive advantage. In addition to
the RBV “value” and “rare” criteria discussed
earlier, to contribute to a sustained competi-
tive advantage, a resource must meet two
further criteria that we consider in turn.
(3) It must be imperfectly imitable/sub-
stitutable in the sense that competing
organizations face cost and/or quality
disadvantages in developing a dupli-
cate of the resource or in developing an
appropriate substitute for it.
In addressing imitability, it is helpful to
consider the importance of history as well as
socially complex resources. As organizations
evolve, they acquire skills, abilities, and re-
sources that may be unique to them. When-
ever the acquisition or development of valu-
able and rare resources depends upon unique
historical circumstances, those imitating
these resources will be at a disadvantage.
While it is relatively easy to purchase physi-
cal resources or software, this is not the case
with socially complex resources (i.e., organi-
zational phenomena such as trust, friend-
ship, teamwork, culture, and reputation).
The importance of history and related so-
cially complex resources foreshadows the
fourth RBV criterion:
(4) organization; the firm must be or-
ganized such that it can realize a com-
petitive advantage based on resources
that add value, are rare, and are imper-
fectly imitable/substitutable.
Organizational components are consid-
ered complementary resources as they have
very limited ability to contribute to compet-
itive advantage directly. Their true value
comes in combination with other resources
and capabilities (Barney, 1991, 1995). Nu-
merous aspects of a firm’s organization (e.g.,
structure, control and reward systems, com-
munication, and leadership) are relevant
here. 
In his article “What Is Strategy?” Porter
(1996) makes some RBV-related arguments
that are relevant to the sustainability of com-
petitive advantage. Porter argues that com-
petitive advantage arises from an organiza-
tion’s choice of unique activities and/or by
performing activities more efficiently than
competitors. He argues further that increased
diffusion of best practices in today’s environ-
ment often results in competitive advantage
being temporary.
Porter proposes that activities—their
choice and/or their performance (i.e., how
they are implemented)—form the bases of
sustainable competitive advantage. He states
that firms’ competitive advantages (e.g.,
those of Southwest Airlines and Ikea) are
based on unique, tailored sets of interlocked
activities, with entire business systems of ac-
tivities fitting and reinforcing one another.
Strategic fit among activities reduces costs
and/or increases differentiation and is funda-
mental to the sustainability of competitive
advantage. In other words, it is more difficult





history as well as
socially complex
resources. 
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and activities than it is to imitate one or two
processes, or activities. 
The Moneyball Story and Sustained
Competitive Advantage
The Oakland A’s created competitive advan-
tage through their choice to implement
sabermetrics. During and following the 2003
season, however, two senior managers from
the Athletics’ front office were hired as gen-
eral managers by the Toronto Blue Jays and
the Los Angeles Dodgers (Saraceno, 2004). In
addition, the Boston Red Sox hired the father
of sabermetrics, Bill James, in an advisory ca-
pacity (Hakes & Sauer, 2004). Obvious ques-
tions that come to the fore are: (1) is saber-
metrics, as implemented by the A’s, imitable?
and (2) given the movement of senior man-
agers from the A’s, who were closely involved
in implementing and administering saber-
metrics, has the Athletics’ competitive ad-
vantage been lost?
Very preliminary analyses indicate that
competitive advantage provided by saber-
metrics may not be sustainable. Hakes and
Sauer (2004) argue that sabermetrics has
spread with sufficient speed that prices in
baseball’s labor market no longer exhibit the
“Moneyball anomaly,” that the market ineffi-
ciency disappeared when Athletics’ man-
agers were hired to run competing fran-
chises. We maintain, however, that it
remains too early to make a definitive state-
ment concerning the sustainability of the
Athletics’ sabermetrics-based, competitive
advantage, as their advantage may be sus-
tained by performing sabermetrics more effi-
ciently than their competitors. It might be
that the Athletics’ unique historical circum-
stances and related organizational structure
and systems developed by Beane, as well as
his leadership, will result in a disadvantage
for those attempting to imitate sabermetrics.
Porter’s ideas concerning interlocked ac-
tivities as well as Barney’s proposition that to
sustain a competitive advantage a firm must
be appropriately organized are relevant here.
In addressing whether the Athletics’ saber-
metrics-based competitive advantage will be
sustained, it is useful to consider whether the
Athletics’ socially complex resources (i.e., the
front-office structure, teamwork, and culture
developed by Beane as well as his leadership)
will result in those attempting to imitate
sabermetrics being at a disadvantage. While
a competitive advantage was created by the
Athletics’ choice of implementing sabermet-
rics, their competitive advantage may be sus-
tained by performing sabermetrics more effi-




Preliminary research of the imple-
mentation of sabermetrics pro-
vides some insight into another
way that this innovation might
lead to a sustainable advantage.
This research indicates that an
MLB team, the Cleveland Indi-
ans, under the leadership of Gen-
eral Manager Mark Shapiro and
his top management team, has
adopted an innovative, inter-
locked systems approach in im-
plementing sabermetrics. The In-
dians have done so through the
design and implementation of two propri-
etary programs—DiamondView and Player-
Plan. These two innovative programs incor-
porate the four functions of the HRM cycle
(recruiting and selection, appraisal, training and
development, and compensation). Consistent
with Porter’s interlocked business systems ar-
gument, the HRM cycle should operate as a
congruent, reinforcing system. Also consis-
tent with Porter, to the extent that sabermet-
rics is limited to any one HRM subsystem
(e.g., recruiting and selection), its sustainability
will be limited while to the extent that saber-
metrics is implemented in a systematic, ho-
listic manner, the sustainability of advan-
tages gained will be greater. 
The Indians’ DiamondView is a compre-
hensive player database system that is up-
dated electronically on a daily basis. It con-
tains scouting reports, player statistics,
biographical information, injury reports,
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payroll information, and notes from trade
discussions for the nearly 6,000 major- and
minor-league professional baseball players.
The purpose of the system is to increase the
precision of appraising players’ performance
and value. DiamondView thus facilitates re-
cruiting and selection and has also facilitated
the determination of optimum team salary
distributions (Vinella & Mangels, 2003).
PlayerPlan is a detailed program for
player training and development. The objective
of PlayerPlan is to precisely evaluate and im-
prove each player’s skills. Coaches and in-
structors determine a player’s
needs (physical, baseball funda-
mentals, mental) and develop a
plan to overcome identified defi-
ciencies. The manager and player
discuss the plan, with the objec-
tive of the player taking owner-
ship. The plan is added to the
player’s file in DiamondView
(Vinella & Mangels, 2003).
We see then that the Cleve-
land Indians use DiamondView
and PlayerPlan in (a) recruiting
and selection, (b) appraisal, (c)
training and development, and
(d) compensation. We believe that
this systematic, holistic approach
taken by the Indians in applying Moneyball
insights, consistent with Porter’s arguments
concerning unique, tailored sets of inter-
locked activities that reinforce one another,
will contribute to the sustainability of advan-
tages gained. Importantly, the Indians’ HR in-
novations have been implemented by what
Chen (2004) has described as “the new breed
of front-office executives: fresh, Ivy League-
educated faces . . . men who often have less
(than) impressive baseball credentials . . . (but
are) believers of the importance of statistical
evaluation.”4 Outcomes related to the inte-
grative approach taken by the Indians in ap-
plying Moneyball insights are presented in
Table II (Mark Shapiro assumed the role of
general manager subsequent to the 2001 sea-
son). One notes all of the outcomes moving
in the desired direction. Dramatic decreases
in payroll have been accomplished by sub-
stantial increases in the winning percentage.
Implications of the Moneyball Story
for the HR Executive: Achieving
Sustained Competitive Advantage
The potential of a sabermetrics-type HR ap-
proach to constitute a source of sustainable
competitive advantage is relatively high.
Such an approach would require HR profes-
sionals with substantial skills in strategic
thinking, analytics, and change manage-
ment. In a recent study conducted by Towers
Perrin (2005), however, these were three of
the five lowest-rated skills of existing HR pro-
fessionals. 
In particular, HR professionals facile with
data are few and far between. As Carrig and
Wright (in press) note, analytical skills be-
come more and more important within an
information-based economy. Too often, “in-
formation” is defined only with regard to
products and services related to external cus-
tomers, rather than information being recog-
nized as having critical importance to the in-
ternal workings of organizations. Yet few HR
professionals have requisite skills to analyze
data in a way that might enable the firm to
create performance advantages.
Note that this state of affairs stems logi-
cally from the facts that (a) HR has never had
to analyze much data because (b) organiza-
tions did not have much data to analyze and
(c) past technology did not allow for efficient
data analysis. As we have seen and discussed,
the technology now exists, and it is being
combined with vast reservoirs of data. The
only missing piece to the puzzle is the HR
professional’s competency to use the tech-
nology and data to derive superior human
capital strategies.
The potential for the sustainability of
such an advantage stems in large part from
the rareness of HR professionals with these
analytical skills along with a professional
culture that values fads to a greater extent
than research-based knowledge (Rynes, Col-
ber, & Brown, 2002). Firms that build the ca-
pability to develop and implement informa-
tion-based human capital strategies will
likely be able to maintain that advantage for
a significant period of time. As is the case
with the implementation of sabermetrics,
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new skill sets and a supportive organiza-
tional culture will be necessary for the suc-
cessful implementation of information-
based human capital innovations.
Conclusion:The Relevance of the
Moneyball Story to HR Executives
Moneyball describes the story of how the
Oakland Athletics overcame cultural obsta-
cles to implement sabermetrics—a data-
based approach to organizational decision
making—in a manner that created a compet-
itive advantage. We have explored this story
through the lens of the management of in-
novation and strategic management litera-
tures to draw some implications for HRM.
This leads us to the following concluding
thoughts.
Information/Data Becomes
Increasingly Important to Effective
Human Capital Management
The recent obsessions with human capital
management, HR metrics, and HRIS have
tended to travel parallel paths with little syn-
ergy. While some of the metrics have focused
on human capital, and human capital might
be an input to an HRIS, what seemingly has
been missing is an integrated approach to
human capital strategy that realizes the syn-
ergies among these different components. 
Just as MLB had a focus on talent (i.e.,
human capital), on statistics (i.e., metrics)
and recently on information technology, it
was not until sabermetrics provided the plat-
form for integrating all three that the Oak-
land Athletics were able to exploit the infor-
mation asymmetries inherent in their com-
petitive environment. These three levers all
now exist within the larger corporate envi-
ronment, but the question remains concern-
ing who will be the first to integrate them,
and thus, identify and exploit the informa-
tion asymmetries that exist. 
The Competencies of HR
Professionals Will Have to Change
As academics that have taught HR profes-
sionals throughout their undergraduate and
graduate careers, we have had numerous
opportunities to observe how they ap-
proach certain courses within the curricu-
lum. Regardless of the university, future HR
practitioners almost universally shy away
from the more analytical classes such as sta-
tistics, research methods, operations man-
agement, management information sys-
tems, accounting, and finance. If not
required, future HR managers avoid these
classes. If such classes are required, they are
endured in order to receive a passing grade
without truly capturing the knowledge pro-
vided. In a “Moneyball” world of HRM, the
knowledge and skills required will be pro-
vided in the very classes that prospective
HR professionals detest. 
Efforts by baseball teams to adopt saber-
metrics have brought about “the new breed
of front-office executives: fresh, Ivy League-
educated faces . . . men who often have less
impressive baseball credentials than Garth
Brooks. For a stat-head to break into the big
leagues was, not long ago, almost unheard
of. Now believers of the importance of statis-
tical evaluation are infiltrating management
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2002 2003 2004 2005
Win % 45.7 42.0 49.4 57.4
Win % Rank* 20.0 25.0 17.0 6.0
Payroll Rank 9.0 26.0 27.0 26.0
Cost/Win Rank 25.0 11.0 3.0 2.0
* among 30 teams
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and infusing teams with a Wall Street-style
sensibility for ‘beating the market’” (Chen,
2004, p. 64). There will likely have to be  par-
allel changes in the type of individuals who
work in HR for sabermetric-type HR innova-
tions to be implemented.
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NOTES
1. The term innovation is often used loosely and in-
terchangeably with terms such as change. One of
the most frequently cited academic definitions of
innovation suggests that it refers to “any idea,
practice, or material artifact perceived as new by
the relevant unit of adoption” (Zaltman et al.,
1973). Differentiators of innovation are scale (the
extent to which there is a radical break with the
past) and domain (the extent to which the innova-
tion is new to the world or simply new within a
specific context). In the main, most analysts are
interested in innovations that make a significant
impact rather than mere routine and incidental
change (Storey, 2004, pp. xvi–xvii). Sabermetrics
is clearly a radical innovation, one that remains
novel; the first “sabermetrics draft” was con-
ducted by the Athletics in 2002 (Lewis, 2003), and
only five (or so) MLB teams have adopted it to
date. As it diffuses, of course, sabermetrics will
become less novel. As that occurs, however, we
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embrace the perspective that sabermetrics will be
an innovation to each team that adopts it since it
will be new to that organization (Rogers, 1985).
2. Adopting a sabermetrics approach thus implies
changes in a number of areas: in performance sta-
tistics, player assessment, and in-game tactics.
Baseball teams can “dabble” in aspects of saber-
metrics; in considering sabermetrics a radical inno-
vation, however, we are referring to its broad-
based use, as exemplified by the Oakland Athletics.
3. While we adopt Barney’s broad definition of re-
sources, others differentiate resources from capa-
bilities (e.g., Hoopes, Madsen, & Walker, 2003;
Makadok, 2001), defining a capability as “a special
type of resource—specifically, an organizationally
embedded, nontransferable, firm-specific resource
whose purpose is to improve the productivity of
other resources possessed by the firm” (Makadok,
2001, p. 389).
4. Central to the implementation of these initiatives
by the Indians are Mark Shapiro, executive VP and
general manager, graduate of Princeton University;
Chris Antonetti, assistant general manager, gradu-
ate of Georgetown University; and Mike Chernoff,
assistant director of baseball operations, graduate
of Princeton University.
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D
ifferent strands of evidence suggest
that Michael Lewis’s (2003) book,
Moneyball, has attracted the atten-
tion of management scholars.
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) gave it a
glowing review in the New Republic, the fine
article by Wolfe, Wright, and Smart (2006)
in this issue grew out of a well-attended ses-
sion at the 2005 Academy of Management
meetings, and Roberto (2005) recently wrote
a Harvard Business School case on this topic.
Moreover, our own informal conversations
with colleagues indicate that the book has
caught their eye. Some of the reasons for
scholars’ growing interest in Moneyball may
be independent of its implications for man-
agement. After all, baseball is the great
American pastime, and many of us have
deep connections to the game. We played it
as kids and we are longtime fans. Indeed,
one of us has been an ardent Yankees fan for
about 50 years, whereas the other has been
a loyal Red Sox fan for approximately 30,
living proof that coauthorship conquers all.
Aside from having an affinity for the sport,
management scholars are sympathetic to
the sabermetrics method, a data-driven ap-
proach to making decisions that is consis-
tent with the scientific enterprise in which
many of us are engaged.
Perhaps more to the point, Moneyball
provides a playing field for many topics of
interest to management scholars, spanning
micro and macro levels of analysis. At the
micro level, Moneyball speaks to an ongoing
debate in human judgment and decision
making: whether people in organizations
should rely on hard data (e.g., systematically
recorded evidence) versus soft data (e.g.,
those gathered from intuition) to form judg-
ments and make decisions. In the clinical
and organizational psychology literatures,
this debate finds expression in the long-
standing question of whether data gathered
from tests or structured interviews are more
predictive of behavior than is information
gleaned from unstructured interviews or
clinical impressions (Meehl, 1954). 
The “hard versus soft” distinction also
appears to apply to the decision-making
style used by the longtime chairman of the
Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, and his
successor, Ben Bernanke. In the New York
Times (Andrews, Porter, & Uchitelle, 2005),
one of Mr. Bernanke’s long-time colleagues
predicted that Mr. Bernanke will “probably
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work towards depersonalizing monetary pol-
icy.” That same colleague also suggested that
Mr. Bernanke is an advocate of Bill James’s
books on sabermetrics, “which often argues
for statistical analysis over intuition. . . . Per-
haps the best way to establish transparency,
Mr. Bernanke has written, is to set up an eas-
ily understandable process. It is in many
ways the opposite of the image that Mr.
Greenspan has helped cultivate,
that of an oracle.” 
The tension between using
hard and soft data also underlies
the veritable explosion of theory
and research in the related fields of
behavioral decision making, be-
havioral economics, and behav-
ioral finance (e.g., Belsky &
Gilovich, 1999). The normative
view in classic economic models
would have us believe that people
are tough-minded scientists who
rely on hard data to form judg-
ments and make decisions. In-
stead, we find that people also rely
on cognitive shortcuts, intuitions,
and “gut feelings,” often leading
to decisions that deviate from a
classical definition of economic rationality. 
In considering prospective talent for his
organization, Billy Beane, for his part, draws
more on statistical evidence (i.e., objective
indicators of a player’s previous perform-
ance, which is assumed to be the best pre-
dictor of future performance) than on the
more subjective impressions of so-called ex-
perts in judging talent. Perhaps this is be-
cause reliance on subjective impressions led
Billy Beane to be misjudged early in his play-
ing career. As a high school player, Billy
Beane seemed to fit the profile of someone
who could develop into a major league star.
He possessed impressive physical skills that
occasionally helped him to perform great
feats on the field. Relying on this representa-
tiveness heuristic in appraising Billy Beane,
major league scouts somehow did not take
into account the harder evidence—for exam-
ple, the fact that his on-field performance
plummeted from his junior to his senior year
of high school. 
Sabermetrics further suggests that the
hard data underlying subjective impressions
may themselves be problematic. It is not
simply that Billy Beane relies on objective in-
dicators. Rather, he relies on the kinds of ob-
jective measures that have statistically been
proven to be more valid indicators of a
player’s true value than those conventionally
measured. For example, players, fans, man-
agers, and Hall of Fame election committees
have long believed that a player’s batting av-
erage is a tried and true indicator of his
value. Batting average is important, to be
sure, but may be less revealing of a player’s
true value than is his on-base percentage.
Rather than being anchored to the conven-
tional wisdom about how players should be
appraised, Beane has relied on a different set
of criteria, enabling him to be a considerably
more efficient manager of human resources
than his counterparts at some of the more
free-spending major league teams. 
By touching on topics of interest to man-
agement scholars, Moneyball may help to
stimulate further thinking and research. To
provide just one example, whereas sabermet-
rics predicates the use of hard data over soft,
certain conditions may exist under which
the latter is more diagnostic. In Blink, Glad-
well (2005) reviews scientific evidence that
“snap judgments” may be remarkably accu-
rate, sometimes more so than judgments ar-
rived at on the basis of hard facts. To be sure,
decisions are usually more likely to be ac-
cepted and implemented in organizational
settings if they appear to be based upon a
hard-nosed analysis. However, the hard-
nosed analysis itself may not be necessary for
improved judgment and decision making.
Thus, an extremely important matter for fu-
ture research is to delineate when and why
data-driven versus soft approaches lead to
better judgment and decision making.
As with most complex matters, contin-
gency theories may be more useful than
hard and fast rules in mediating this debate.
For example, sabermetrics suggests that cer-
tain in-game strategies, such as bunting and
stealing, are not advised. However, they
may make sense in certain situations (e.g.,
in stealing, when a base runner is excep-
…an extremely
important matter for
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tionally quick or a pitcher is unusually slow
to the plate). Moreover, sabermetrics is
based on the premise that a player’s past
performance is the best predictor of his fu-
ture performance. Right off the bat (so to
speak), we know that this is not always the
case, such as when a player has been in-
jured or has reached a certain age. Clearly,
contingency approaches may be helpful to
baseball executives, but what may be most
interesting to management scholars is de-
termining how much complexity (e.g., the
absolute number of contingencies factored
into a single decision) is sensible for practi-
tioners to consider. 
At the macro level of analysis, Moneyball
has important implications for theory and
research on organizational innovation and
organizational change. The innovation lit-
erature has concerned itself with two re-
lated questions. First, what factors predis-
pose organizations to adopt certain
innovations? Second, what factors make
adopted innovations more versus less likely
to be successful? Moneyball speaks to both
of these matters. Whereas Billy Beane was
the first baseball general manager to base
his decisions on sabermetrics to a signifi-
cant degree, sabermetrics had been around
for a long time; Bill James began writing his
books in the 1970s. Why, then, was it
adopted by Billy Beane and not others, and
relatedly, why did it take so long for base-
ball executives to take heed? Moneyball re-
minds us that innovation adoption is
jointly determined by personal and situa-
tional factors. Some of the personal inputs
highlighted in this case include Billy
Beane’s high level of energy, his credibility
(having played the game), and his powers
of persuasion. Situational factors include
the fact that his organizational superiors
gave him a wide degree of decision-making
latitude. 
Moreover, as Wolfe, Wright, and Smart
(2006) point out, what may have given
Beane a competitive advantage over his
counterparts who did not adopt sabermetrics
is that major league baseball (as an industry)
is steeped in tradition. Much of the innova-
tion literature has examined factors residing
within organizations that affect the likeli-
hood of successful implementation of inno-
vations. Moneyball (and Wolfe et al.’s analy-
sis) suggests that factors residing external to
organizations also have much to say about
whether innovations will be successful. To
the extent that success depends upon being
the first mover, or on competitors being slow
to adopt the innovation, Beane’s early suc-
cess may be due to an exceptionally strong
industrywide tendency to maintain the sta-
tus quo. 
The book also reminds management
scholars and practitioners of the
need to delineate factors that en-
able organizations to maintain the
competitive advantage produced
by innovation. One of the poten-
tial downsides of being a success-
ful innovator is that competitors
begin to watch your every move,
which may threaten continued
success. For example, if Beane
were to express interest in a less-
touted prospect (by, say, flying
out to a game to watch him play),
richer teams might interpret his
actions as a sign that the player is
undervalued, thereby leading
them to offer the player more
money than Beane could. This
dynamic reflects a fundamental
rule about the nature of competi-
tion: to the extent that the bases of compet-
itive advantage are public knowledge, com-
petitive advantage becomes more difficult to
maintain. In fact, several other teams have
actively embraced sabermetrics as a basis of
decision making, and one (the Los Angeles
Dodgers) even hired one of Beane’s chief
lieutenants (Paul DePodesta). Interestingly
enough, however, the Dodgers did not per-
form particularly well on DePodesta’s watch,
and he was recently fired. 
One of the most intriguing macro themes
emerging from Moneyball is the baseball sys-
tem’s reactions to Beane’s innovation. System
reactions (or lack thereof) actually began more
than 30 years ago, when Bill James wrote his
first books. James’s approach was potentially a
source of huge competitive advantage. Why,
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then, was it ignored for so long? The baseball
establishment’s initial (and long-running) re-
jection of sabermetrics is reminiscent of an-
other example of how a system may dismiss a
source of competitive advantage.
In the classic Gunfire at Sea, Morison
(1966) describes how at the turn of the twen-
tieth century, a junior officer in the U.S.
Navy, William Sims, notified his superiors of
a technological breakthrough (known as
continuous-aim firing) that improved shoot-
ing accuracy by 3000%. His superiors re-
sponded first by ignoring Sims, then by
denying that such a breakthrough was possi-
ble, and finally by branding Sims as a “crack-
brained egotist, . . . a deliberate falsifier of ev-
idence” (p. 135). 
As Wolfe, Wright, and Smart (2006) sug-
gest, innovation threatens those with a
vested interest in maintaining the status
quo. That vested interest sometimes runs so
deep that it may override technical rational-
ity, as in, “Don’t bother me with facts, my
mind is made up.” In this sense, it is easy to
understand why the baseball scouts in Billy
Beane’s organization would reject sabermet-
rics. After all, if sabermetrics was in, it meant
that they would be out (of jobs). However,
Moneyball reminds us that organizational in-
novations affect multiple constituents who
may have other reasons for wanting to main-
tain the status quo, such as when their sense
of personal identity is based upon the system
as it existed prior to the innovation. In his
prologue to the book, Michael Lewis re-
counts how Joe Morgan, a baseball Hall of
Famer, and now a baseball announcer for
ESPN, was in such denial about the implica-
tions of Moneyball that he could not even
correctly identify its author; Morgan insisted
that Billy Beane, and not Michael Lewis,
wrote the book. 
In conclusion, we believe that Moneyball
elucidates many valuable insights unearthed
by management scholars. So, while we pay
homage to the veridicality of the book’s ideas
as they play out on the baseball diamond, we
also feel inspired to conduct future research
that may lead to greater insights for both the
organizational theorist and practitioner. Mon-
eyball and management—now, there’s a great
double play combination.
We are indebted to Richard Wolfe for his
constructive comments on an earlier version of
the manuscript.
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W
hen Moneyball was published in
2003, I violated my principle of
never paying full price for a
hardcover book. Waiting a week
or two for the 30% discount to
become available in my local bookstore was
too high a price to pay given the attractive-
ness of a Michael Lewis book about statistics
and baseball for a person like me who: (1)
relished Lewis’s previous book The New New
Thing, (2) was trained as a mathematician
and statistician, and (3) continued a life-
long dysfunctional, emotional relationship
with the Boston Red Sox. As Moneyball aptly
points out, you have to question the con-
ventional wisdom (e.g., “never buy at full
price”) and, in this case, I was glad I did.
The $24.95 list price was a bargain for in-
sights into the game I love. But the book
also provided me stimulation to think
about the job I was doing as the “general
manager” (sort of anyway, the analogy is
not perfect) of a business school whose en-
dowment (both physical plant and dollars)
was Oakland A’s–like, suffering in compari-
son to the institutes which we call our “peer
institutions” or “competitors” depending
upon the circumstance.
While most would say that Moneyball is
a book about Billy Beane, to me it is a book
about two people—Bill James, the philoso-
pher and conceptualizer of the ideas, and
Beane, the implementer within an industry
decidedly not receptive to the James gospel.
The question “are Moneyball ideas applicable
to managing a business school or other or-
ganizations?” really has two parts. First, is
the message of the James gospel relevant to
business schools and, second, if so, can these
lessons be implemented by perhaps taking a
page from Beane’s book?
The James Gospel
James’s central message is not to “use statis-
tics” in management but rather to apply the
scientific method. Baseball’s “violation” of
the scientific method is noted throughout
the Moneyball book.
For example,
• To describe the scouting of future
mediocre major league player Billy Beane
as a high-school baseball star we are told:
“Each time the scouts saw Billy they saw
only what they wanted to see: a future big
league star” (Lewis, p. 8, emphasis mine).
• More generally, on the traditional scouts of
talent, “the old scouts are like a Greek cho-
rus, it is their job to underscore the eternal
R O B E R T  J .  D O L A N
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themes of baseball. . . . the old scouts aren’t
built to argue; they are built to agree”
(Lewis, p. 30, emphasis in original).
The evaluation of talent in baseball suf-
fered from a flaw common to many scientific
and management endeavors—namely, the
seeking of and granting salience to only
those data capable of confirming prior be-
liefs. James described the result of this atti-
tude being “a great portion of the sport’s tra-
ditional knowledge is ridiculous hokum”
(Lewis, p. 94). James advocated the use of
statistics but worried that without a more
fundamental shift in thinking from seeking
confirming data to a hypothesis testing and
revision model, the wide availability of sta-
tistics would create a situation where “we are
no longer capable of truly assimilating any
knowledge which might result from them”
(p. 95).
Lewis himself describes the “whole point
of James” as adoption of the scientific
method: “Think for yourself along rational
lines. Hypothesize, test against the evidence,
and never accept that a question has been
answered as well as it ever will be. Don’t be-
lieve a thing is true just because some fa-
mous baseball player says that it is true”
(Lewis, p. 98).
At its core, the primary message of Mon-
eyball is the same one advancing the scien-
tific method at the heart of the research
methods course taught in graduate schools
everywhere. It is old advice, just delivered in
a more fascinating and engaging way (at
least to a baseball fan) than we typically en-
counter in the academic literature.
Defining the “major lessons” of Money-
ball in this way renders moot the question of
“are Moneyball lessons applicable to manage-
ment of business schools and other organi-
zations?” Figure 1 draws on the Wolfe,
Wright, and Smart article’s partitioning of
the input to the system as (1) performance
characteristics of players and (2) in-game de-
cisions. The advocacy of applying a rigorous,
scientific approach to defining the right out-
come measures and developing understand-
ing of the workings of the system portrayed
in Figure 1 extend to all organizations.
Beane Implementation
Beane is a “necessity is the mother of inven-
tion” story. When asked, “How do you, as a
$40 million bankrolled team, compete with
the Yankees and its $226 million potential?”
Beane gave the smart, yet simple answer:
“What you don’t do is what the Yankees do.
If we do what the Yankees do, we lose every
time….” (Lewis, p. 119). So, knowing what
not to do is a good start, but there are still
lots of options left.
Beane could only redefine the output side
of Figure 1 a little bit. It would be hard to dif-
ferentiate yourself from the Yan-
kees by changing your objective
function from “winning games”
to “losing games.” Beane’s only
chance was to understand how
the system in Figure 1 worked bet-
ter than others did and then use
that improved understanding to
develop the people to operate the
system and provide them explicit
instructions on what to do within
a game (e.g., take a pitch, swing
away, bunt, hit and run, steal, tag
up). Why was he successful at the “radical
human resource management innovation”?
(Wolfe et al., p. 112). Simple—he could con-
trol both inputs on the left side of Figure 1.
For example, when the previous base-stealing
wizard was acquired by Oakland and told to
stop attempting steals, he did.
Beane and Business Schools
If Beane were the leader of a business school,
he would find more degrees of freedom in
defining the objective function. While there
really is only one plausible objective func-
tion for a Major League Baseball team, such
is not the case for business schools. While we
each state that we seek to develop leaders,
our approaches to that are fundamentally
different. There is no World Series champion
each year in business schools. On that score,
it would be easier to do “what the Yankees
don’t” on a reasonable outcome measure.
On the other hand, a Beane repotted into
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tions” more strong and binding than in the
baseball world. The way we evaluate talent is
codified in our tenure standards, and those
standards are formally adopted by the faculty.
There is a “strictness” in our process and cri-
teria for selection of talent that is more bind-
ing than baseball. In this circumstance, the
job of the general manager is less an individ-
ual understanding of the system’s operation
than guidance of a faculty process to promote
adoption of the right standards and rigorous,
scientific application of those standards.
FIGURE 1. Schematic of a Baseball System.
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P
rofessors Wolfe, Wright, and Smart
investigate the Moneyball story and
apply the lessons learned to the role
of the human resources executive.
The views presented in the article
should stimulate thoughts within the
human resources profession and enable
these professionals to be more successful at
implementing innovations in their organi-
zations. In this commentary, I consider the
article in the context of the sports business,
with particular emphasis on basketball. For
purposes of this commentary, it is perhaps
more appropriate to say the “business of
sport,” since the main focus of my thoughts
will be on the business side of sport. Make
no mistake about it—sports itself is big busi-
ness, as some individual teams generate
hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue
and will likely soon be bought and sold for
close to a billion dollars. Therefore, I address
both the business and sports sides in the
“business of sport.”
The Moneyball Approach: Basketball
and the Business Side of Sport 
The use of statistics to assist in the assess-
ment and management of player personnel
has particular relevance in baseball. The rel-
atively independent nature of the game and
methods to measure a baseball player’s per-
formance and contribution to his team, to-
gether with baseball’s long history of col-
lecting statistics, ensure that baseball is a
fertile ground for statistical analysis.
In basketball, however, statistics are not
as easily used to measure a player’s contribu-
tion to team performance. Due to the nature
of the game itself, basketball players are
more dependent on each other for the
team’s performance than are baseball play-
ers. Therefore, it is necessarily more difficult
to use statistics to assess player personnel in
basketball (and various other sports) than it
is in baseball.
Statistics being less relevant in assessing
a basketball player’s performance and con-
tribution to his team, however, does not
mean that statistics are irrelevant. The ques-
tions are how relevant are they, how should
they be used, and how much weight should
they be given in team management? Cer-
tainly, statistics such as shooting percentage,
points per game, and rebounds per game are
part of the basketball vernacular and are
therefore often used by team management.
While we have not yet seen what could be
described as a “revolution” in baseball, bas-
ketball teams are, as was described in a re-
cent Sports Illustrated article (Ballard, 2005),
beginning to incorporate statistical analysis
A L A N  O S T F I E L D
Correspondence to: Alan J. Ostfield, Palace Sports & Entertainment, 3 Championship Drive, Auburn Hills, MI
48326-1752.
COMMENTARY ON 
“RADICAL HRM INNOVATION AND
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: 
THE MONEYBALL STORY”
T H E  M O N E Y B A L L  A P P R O A C H — B A S K E T B A L L  A N D
T H E  B U S I N E S S  S I D E  O F  S P O R T
The Moneyball Approach—Basketball and the Business Side of Sport          137
into their decision making along the lines
described in Moneyball. In the years ahead,
with the sports business continuing to
evolve, the risks of the business continuing
to increase, and the success of Moneyball
teams in baseball, we might very well see
basketball teams increase their use of statis-
tics in the assessment and management of
player personnel.
A larger point to be taken from Money-
ball and the Wolfe, Wright, and Smart arti-
cle that applies to the sport side of basket-
ball, the business side of sport, and to more
traditional businesses is the increased use of
objective data in an organization’s decision-
making processes. The “innovation” de-
scribed in Moneyball—the use of additional
and more objective data to assist in the as-
sessment and management of baseball play-
ers—has implications far beyond baseball,
player assessment, and sports. Businesses,
regardless of the industry, can benefit from
incorporating a wider range of information
(including more objective information)
into their decision-making processes. As
Wolfe, Wright, and Smart state, the “supe-
rior use of data to exploit information
asymmetries” is what gives an organization
the ability to make better decisions than
others and obtain a competitive advantage.
A related issue in considering the applica-
tion of the Moneyball approach to baseball,
basketball, or business is the way that the
organization and decision makers bring rel-
evant disciplines together and balance the
use of the available and appropriate infor-
mation. The leader must bring together all
of the various disciplines and balance the
use of objective (and perhaps trendy) infor-
mation with other subjective (and perhaps
traditional) forms of information. The ap-
propriate blend of information depends on
the particular circumstances. 
Perhaps, in certain cases, the Moneyball
approach has dominated other relevant in-
formation and elements of analyses (e.g., the
traditional subjective views of scouts). Or
perhaps the Moneyball approach only ap-
pears to have dominated in certain cases be-
cause it received so much publicity due to its
contrast with baseball’s traditional reliance
on subjective information. A person making
decisions regarding baseball players (or other
types of employees) needs to have an appro-
priate framework for evaluating players (or
other types of employees). This framework
could include the traditional, subjective data
as well as the newly publicized and/or devel-
oped objective data. Properly balancing and
using all relevant data is what good leaders
do, creates good decision-making processes,
and produces effective decisions, something
to which all leaders (whether evaluating
players or “traditional” employees) should
strive.
Major Change and the
Importance of Timing
As described in Moneyball and by
Wolfe, Wright, and Smart, the
Oakland Athletic’s experienced a
set of circumstances that created
the impetus for the implementa-
tion of sabermetrics. Significant
change was needed, as the team’s
revenue structure did not permit
them to compete with large-rev-
enue teams in the traditional
way. The Athletics’ timing was
particularly right, as they were in
the unique situation of having
seven first-round picks in the
2002 draft described in Money-
ball. This increased the benefits
of being right and the risks of
being wrong, thus placing greater pressure
on their drafting decisions. Finally, but per-
haps most importantly, the A’s had a leader
who could make it happen, as Billy Beane
had the pedigree of having been a
ballplayer, the knowledge that something
different was needed, the willingness to act
outside the norm, and the security of know-
ing that ownership was fully behind him.
While other organizations outside of profes-
sional sports often experience similar dy-
namics that necessitate change, such dy-
namics might be particularly applicable to
professional sports teams given the “haves”
and “have-nots” distinction that often exists
among them.
The leader must
bring together all of
the various
disciplines and
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Major Change and the Likelihood of
Resistance
Moneyball and the Wolfe, Wright, and Smart
article describe the resistance met by Billy
Beane and his like-minded colleagues when
they tilted the decision-making process
toward reliance on statistics and away from
traditional subjective assessment. The resist-
ance that Beane confronted is understand-
able given the tradition-bound nature of
baseball and the experiences of many of the
people whom Beane was dependent upon to
implement sabermetrics (the scouts’ experi-
ence was limited to baseball and to tradi-
tional subjective, as opposed to objective,
statistical assessment of talent).
There would likely be resistance to signif-
icant change in basketball for many of the
same reasons. However, basketball might be
more accepting of change than baseball,
given that factors such as baseball’s long his-
tory and significance of tradition are not as
influential in basketball. Also, National Bas-
ketball Association Commissioner David
Stern has been, and continues to be, quite
progressive. He and his staff often push for
and are receptive to new ideas, so change is
more likely to be accepted (and, in fact, en-
couraged) in the NBA.
Factors That Enabled the Oakland
A’s to Successfully Implement the
Moneyball Innovation
By all measures, the Oakland A’s under the
leadership of Billy Beane were successful at
implementing a new method of assessing
and managing player personnel. But this was
no easy task. The Oakland A’s had strong
leadership (ownership, president, and gen-
eral manager), a good public face for the
change in Billy Beane, a very strong belief in
the appropriateness and necessity of the
change, and an infrastructure (including
like-minded, appropriately educated, young
baseball operations executives) that was able
to support the desired change. In addition,
Beane and the A’s had several “early victo-
ries,” both in the form of particular players
doing well and the A’s making the playoffs,
that helped them to overcome initial doubts
and hurdles, provided continued confidence
that they were proceeding along the appro-
priate path, and propelled them to contin-
ued change and improvement.
To successfully implement change of any
significant magnitude, an organization needs
a variety of factors working together at the ap-
propriate time. To increase the odds that im-
plementing change will be successful, leaders
should recognize the natural difficulty often
associated with change, attempt to implement
change with the right people at the right time
(organizations too often attempt to imple-
ment change in challenging times, when peo-
ple most want to hold on to what has worked
in the past), estimate the types and amount of
resistance to be faced and develop a plan for
addressing such resistance and managing the
change. The factors that led to the Oakland As’
success in implementing sabermetrics should
be emulated to the extent possible by any busi-
ness considering implementing a change of
this magnitude.
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W
olfe, Wright, and Smart posit a
significant overlap between the
approach to baseball that Billy
Beane advances in Michael
Lewis’s 2003 book Moneyball
and the challenges faced everyday by HR
professionals in corporations across the
country. The reasoning and assessment put
forth in this article not only is accurate, but
it also previews the increasingly complex
and analytical role expected of today’s HR
professionals.
The race for talent and the impending
demographic challenges facing employers
have been well documented for some time,
yet most HR professionals have not yet re-
sponded to this reality with new or innova-
tive thinking. Most continue to approach
talent management with the same toolbox
that they have always used, relying on in-
stinct, experience, and street smarts in
much the same way that the old-school
scouts of the Oakland A’s did prior to the ar-
rival of Billy Beane.
The transition from intuition to analyt-
ics in any field should not be surprising,
given the vast amount of information avail-
able on any subject. We can instantly learn
about individuals’ performance and general
human behavior, and the achievement of
business results. HR professionals must ex-
plore these data and identify elements that
differentiate the best performers currently in
their organizations as well as the best
prospective hires. If HR can focus talent
management efforts on the true differentia-
tors and organize that talent effectively, they
will secure the talent required to deliver ex-
ceptional performance.
HR can learn from other organizational
functions. For example, the finance profes-
sion went through a metamorphosis in
which it moved from the traditional back-
ward-looking discipline of accounting to the
more forward-looking discipline of analysis
and planning. Similarly, the HR profession
must move from the backward-looking dis-
cipline of performance appraisal to the more
forward-looking science of predictive analy-
sis. Each organizational function has a re-
sponsibility to define its decision science;
one that allows their organization to look
forward and then act, not just look back-
ward and then react.
This need for a forward-looking perspec-
tive means that traditional “scorecards” no
longer are sufficient to lead the human cap-
ital decisions necessary in every organiza-
tion. Scorecards tell you where you have
been and what has been done. Predictive de-
D AV E  PA C E
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cision metrics, while they might be based on
analyses of traditional scorecard data, tell
you where you need to go. HR professionals
should be held to the same standard of pre-
dictive analysis for people decisions that fi-
nance professionals are held to for capital-al-
location decisions. 
This perspective sends a chill down the
spine of many HR traditionalists. Much the
same as the traditional scouts for the A’s,
many HR professionals have established
their roles as the premier “readers” of tal-
ent, able to assess potential based upon an
instinctive analysis of a candidate’s em-
ployment history and idiosyncratic an-
swers to the “tried and true” questions of
the HR interview.
While enhanced data analysis and per-
formance predictability will no doubt be skills
required of the future generation of HR lead-
ers, the fact is that many of today’s HR leaders
still have a “get out of jail free” card to fall
back on in the absence of such analysis. That
escape route is the relatively poor quality of
most human resource information systems
(HRISs). For many years, the focus of most or-
ganizations has been on the continuous im-
provement of traditional financial systems
and/or broad-reaching enterprise resource
planning (ERP) initiatives. The capture of sig-
nificant and meaningful people data, how-
ever, has been overlooked and pushed to the
backburner of systems’ priorities. As Wolfe,
Wright, and Smart point out, many of these
initiatives have resulted in little more than an
accounting of how many people work for an
organization and the minimum requisite
functionality to ensure the completion of
payroll.
The most likely way that organizations
will respond and install the necessary data
systems required to uncover the parallel of
sabermetrics’ “OPS” (on-base percentage plus
slugging percentage) metrics for their human
capital planning needs is if the HR profes-
sional drives it. The Towers Perrin analysis
referenced in the article, however, suggests
that this is unlikely to happen, and that an
organizational change of this magnitude will
require the bold leadership and passion that
Beane showed with the A’s.
Thus, we’re left with an uncomfortable
dilemma; a decision science is needed on the
people side, but the systems required to pro-
duce the foundational data are generally in-
sufficient, and the most likely analysts are
not that interested in going in this direction.
Therein lies the potential for short-term
competitive advantage. Those who dig and
discover these analytics will no doubt create
competitive advantage for their organiza-
tions, but what they are creating is a
methodology that is not necessarily propri-
etary. Once the methodology has been docu-
mented and described, others will be able to
apply it in their own organizations, much
the same as other Major League Baseball
teams have attempted to follow the path laid
out by Billy Beane. This adoption by others
offsets any potential competitive advantage.
If you buy into the approach of
Beane and the analysis of Wolfe,
Wright, and Smart, what is re-
quired to set this up in your organ-
ization to achieve, at least, a short-
term competitive advantage? 
The recipe for success falls
upon several factors. First, the or-
ganization must have a strategi-
cally oriented, analytical chief peo-
ple officer who is comfortable in
the role of change agent. This offi-
cer must define a vision that can be
embraced not only by his or her
function, but also by the entire or-
ganization. Second, a sophisticated
HRIS must be in existence to pro-
vide the raw analytic material.
Data fields must go beyond name, address,
salary, number of dependents, and beneficiary
designation. Third, the HR executive will need
a team of sophisticated “miners” to tear apart
the data, in order to uncover those nuggets
that will form the OPS for their corporation.
This team will likely be the nontraditionalists
within the organization, much as the Ivy
League analysts have emerged as the “seers” of
Major League Baseball talent. This group will
need resilience, as the traditionalists no doubt
will attack their conclusions.
Once these elements are in place, it still







in the role of change
agent. 
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find those truly predictive factors, so that the
result is not just another “HR scorecard.” Se-
nior staff will require convincing, and they
will want to see the link between these data
and financial and customer data in order to
ensure that these predictors actually lead to
business performance. 
Even with all of this in place, judgment
still will be required. It is unlikely that we
will see a day when HR professionals are
transformed into backroom statisticians,
deciding on the best combination of
human traits and behaviors through an al-
gorithm developed by a staff of Ivy League
wonders. The predictability of human per-
formance and the effectiveness of organiza-
tions will always have some unknown fac-
tors. However, we can do better, and it is up
to all of us in the HR profession to move our
discipline from the abacus to the laptop if
we are to adjust to the changing workplace
around us. 
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T
he business of baseball as described in
the Moneyball story has more in com-
mon with HR and effective organiza-
tions than we might think. Five les-
sons from experience common both
to baseball and business are the following:
First of all, past performance—track record—
tends to predict future success. Second, the
difference between success and failure is often
at the margin, the 10% of positive or negative
performance that comes from alignment, ef-
fort, and execution. Third, everything is about
reconciling competing priorities between
quality of performance and the costs associ-
ated with delivering that performance. Next,
nothing happens without talented people. Fi-
nally, we never truly know how things will
turn out; that’s why we play the game.
In addition to the above commonalities
between baseball—indeed all professional
sports—and business, there are universal
truths that bind these worlds together—
people hate change and love to win. It is,
therefore, the leader’s role to define a crys-
tal-clear connection between changing and
winning.
As we think about the role of leaders, con-
sider an emerging trend in Major League Base-
ball. Among others, teams including the New
York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, Cleveland Indi-
ans, Texas Rangers, Tampa Bay Devil Rays, Ari-
zona Diamondbacks, and Oakland Athletics
have hired general managers with a common
attribute—relative youth and inexperience. At
the time of their appointments, most of these
individuals were 28–35 years old, while several
were in their late 30s or early 40s.
Clearly, these baseball executives were not
selected merely because they are relatively
young and inexperienced by traditional base-
ball standards. So, what is going on? Quite
simply, these new leaders have brought an eye
for talent supported by financial acumen and
quantitative analysis, a healthy disrespect for
certain traditions, and a willingness to aggres-
sively advocate for the correlation between
changing and winning. This trend is about
recognizing the critical importance of change
agents—leaders who have the ability to love
the game of baseball from within while objec-
tively standing outside of strongly held con-
ventions and executing on a mandate to
change the way the game is played. Not a bad
set of capabilities for any successful leader of
change, especially HR leaders.
With this parallel between baseball execu-
tives and HR leaders as a foundation, there are
eight implications for how the Moneyball
story might help HR professionals and all
business leaders rethink talent management.
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Strategy versus Structure
Every baseball team has nine players in the
field and nine batters in the lineup. Their
structures are basically the same. However,
their strategies of how to play the game vary
considerably, as do their levels of talent.
Strategy and talent to execute are much
more important than structure. In fact,
strategy and talent are flip sides of the same
coin.
Track Record versus Potential
Long-term potential is a legitimate reason to
take a risk on a talented individual. But rely
more heavily on a past track record
of performance as the best predic-
tor of future success when placing
people in tough assignments.
High-potential people are labeled
as such based on how we have seen
them perform in the past.
Strengths versus Flat
Spots
Focus the majority of develop-
mental actions on building and
capitalizing on people’s strengths,
the 80% of capabilities that breed
their success. Create self-aware-
ness of and work on developmen-
tal needs, but do not overinvest
in fixing things that represent 20% or less of
a person’s path to success.
DNA versus Coachability 
We cannot coach DNA, especially under
stressful conditions when people retreat to
their comfort zones. Selecting the right peo-
ple for the right situation at the right mo-
ment is much more effective than coaching
them to hit a curveball as it approaches home
plate. Select for DNA, coach for technique.
Will versus Skill
Talent is a state of mind, the drive to succeed,
in addition to a set of skills and capabilities.
Over the long run, average talent with ex-
traordinary drive will outperform better talent
with little drive.
Diversity versus Unity
Diversity is fundamentally about surrounding
ourselves with teams of the very best people
who complement one another, making every-
one feel included and creating a unity of pur-
pose. Team unity should not be confused with
everyone doing the same thing, in the same
way, at the same time. Diversity is about or-
chestrating and valuing differences, not creat-
ing sameness. Managed well, diversity and
unity are one and the same.
Yes versus No
The single most important talent manage-
ment decision a leader can make is the an-
swer to the question “Should I pick this per-
son to be on my team?” The difference
between a good decision and a bad decision
is enormous, because good people and bad
people have a significant multiplier effect on
everyone around them—but in completely
opposite directions. Sometimes not choosing
someone to be on our team is the best selec-
tion decision we can make.
Judgment versus Data
Moneyball teaches us there is a place for data
and analysis in managing talent, and in creat-
ing a compelling nexus between changing and
winning. While data may inform decisions
about talent, however, data never should sub-
stitute for good judgment. After all, great lead-
ership is about making good judgments de-
spite bad data. Likewise, good data will rarely
overcome bad judgment.
Moneyball teaches
us there is a place
for data and analysis
in managing talent,
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